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INTRODUCTION
T
here is now virtually universal recognition that the earth
is getting warmer and climate change is happening. In the
last 150 years we have seen a rise in atmospheric concen-
trations of carbon dioxide (“CO2”) by nearly a half.1 Although
the international community has made some attempts to reduce
emissions of CO2, it is increasingly clear that binding targets set
for 2010 under the Kyoto Protocol will not be achieved by a sig-
nificant number of parties. 
The situation is escalating in seriousness. Scientists have
also calculated that the parts per million (“ppm”) targets limiting
CO2 levels, originally considered sufficient for stabilization by
2050, could now be dangerously high and we would have to sig-
nificantly reduce our emissions beyond existing target levels in
order to limit average global temperature increases. It seems we
currently have little alternative
to continuing to burn fossil fuels
for a number of decades. This,
coupled with the enormous
growth of the economies of
China and India, has led many
Governments to believe that
radical action is now required to
reduce atmospheric emissions
of CO2.
One increasingly supported
method of reducing CO2 emis-
sions to the atmosphere is to
capture and store the emissions
in another domain — this
process is known as carbon cap-
ture and storage (“CCS”). CCS is also sometimes known as car-
bon sequestration, although this should not be confused with
biological carbon sequestration, where CO2 that has been
already emitted into the atmosphere is taken up in forests or
soils. CCS involves the capture of CO2 from large industrial
point sources, such as power plants, which account for a high
percentage of CO2 emissions. In basic terms, a giant vacuum
cleaner sucks up the emissions before they are released into the
atmosphere. It is estimated that fitting a power plant with CCS
technology could reduce CO2 emissions by around 85 percent. 
Once captured, the CO2 is transported and stored in either
offshore or onshore sources. Onshore CCS, in sites such as aban-
doned mines, has not been championed to the same extent as off-
shore CCS. For many countries, the infrastructure for onshore
CCS is not in place, and for countries with smaller land masses,
CCS storage sites could be in close proximity to residential
areas. Although CO2 is considered by many to be a safe gas, and
one that we come across most days in products such as carbon-
ated drinks, this could prove controversial.
Offshore disposal, where CO2 is stored directly in the seas, is
also no longer seen as a politically acceptable or favored method
of disposal by the majority. Under CCS projects, CO2 will be
transported to the oceans and artificially piped or injected into
large geological formations under the seabed, such as depleted oil
and gas traps. These projects have already demonstrated their abil-
ity to store fluids over a period of time. Other storage options
include reservoirs or deep saline aquifers under the seas. 
After the CO2 is piped or injected into sub-seabed geologi-
cal formations, the exits are sealed so that the CO2 cannot
escape, allowing it to be stored for long periods of time. For CO2
storage to be an effective way of avoiding climate change, the
CO2 must be stored for hundreds of years so it can bridge the gap
from the use of fossil fuels to the
transition to a hydrogen econ-
omy and other sources of clean
energy.
LEGAL QUESTIONS
REGARDING CCS
CCS in marine waters is
being strongly considered by
national governments and inter-
national bodies. Bodies such as
the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change and the Interna-
tional Energy Agency recently
examined both the feasibility
and potential barriers to using
CCS. These bodies concluded that there remains much ambigu-
ity as to how the legal principles, currently in place under exist-
ing international legislation, will apply to the storage of CO2.2
CCS is a relatively new concept and it does not fall easily
within the remit of international legislation, as such laws were
obviously not designed with this is mind. This paper will firstly
consider the driving factors behind CCS. It will then set out the
potential impacts of existing marine laws and set these in the
context of fast moving international discussions over taking
CCS forward, and possible amendments to marine conventions.
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DRIVING FACTORS BEHIND CCS 
There are a number of factors driving CCS. CO2 can be eco-
nomically useful if it is pumped at high pressure into oil/gas
fields to enable recovery of significant amounts of oil/gas that
are not recoverable through primary methods. The CO2 used in
such enhanced oil/gas recovery operations, such as the Sleipner
field in Norway, remains stored in the field. CCS also offers
some potentially attractive commercial benefits to industry
through potential linkages with emissions trading schemes.
However, what appears to be the main driver for CCS is interna-
tional climate change legislation and its potential to enable gov-
ernments to meet their climate targets.
The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”), adopted in 1997, pro-
vides binding quantified emission limitation and reduction
commitments. Under the Kyoto Protocol, which entered into
force in 2005, developed countries agreed to reduce their emis-
sions to 5.2 percent below 1990 levels over the period
2008–2012. Kyoto compliance is monitored by registries and
annual inventory reports, and these tracked amounts reveal that
many of the largest countries are failing to meet their targets. 
Canada and Japan’s projections show that they are both over
500 million tons (“MT”) of CO2 away from reaching their 2010
targets. If the United States was still a party to Kyoto, then it
would be approximately 2,500 MT away from reaching its target.
The European Union is also projected to narrowly miss its tar-
gets. Only Russia and Poland are expected to comfortably
achieve theirs, and this is only because of a period of economic
instability.3
Missing Kyoto targets undoubtedly increases the threat of
global warming. This problem is compounded because it was
thought for many years in international negotiations that what
was required for stabilization was limiting CO2 levels to 550 ppm
by 2050. Global emissions of CO2 currently stand at around
around 27 gigatonnes (“Gt”) a year, and will reach 44 Gt a year
by 2050 if CO2 levels are limited to 550 ppm. Many scientists
now argue that even this level of CO2 could be dangerously high.
The latest evidence suggests that atmospheric CO2 concentra-
tions would need to stay at least below 450 ppm (an increase of
18.3 Gt a year by 2050), in order to limit average global tempera-
ture increases to two degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels.4
CCS was first considered as a mitigation tool for developed5
countries who were worried that a rapid move away from fossil
fuels would cause serious disruption to their economies, but still
had binding targets to meet under Kyoto. It is now clear (see
Table 1), that although emissions in developed countries, such as
the United States, will have to be drastically kept in check, con-
sumption in developing countries will have the greatest impact
on global atmospheric CO2 levels, and these could eclipse any
further reductions made by the European Union and other
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(“OECD”) countries.
Increases to developing countries’ emissions are primarily
because China and India have around a quarter of the world’s
coal reserves,7 and intend to support their rapid economic devel-
opment by building vast new fleets of new coal-fired plants.
China is currently installing one gigawatt of coal-powered gen-
eration a week and forecasts predict that by 2030, coal-fired
power in India and China will add 3000 million extra tons of
CO2 to the atmosphere every year.8 There is also evidence of
growing economic expansion in other countries such as Brazil. 
The emissions of developing countries need to be kept in
check, with the support of developed countries. Developed
countries have the double-edged sword of not wanting to be seen
to blame the developing countries for trying to catch up in the
industrial and competitive stakes, but at the same time providing
assistance and incentives to react to the potentially catastrophic
problems caused by such massive increases in their emissions. 
Whether CCS can be part of the Clean Development Mech-
anism (“CDM”) under the Kyoto Protocol will become increas-
ingly important. The CDM allows industrialized countries to
purchase project-based emission reduction units from develop-
ing countries. The G-77 (made up of 77 developing countries)
has long been opposed to the inclusion of CCS in the CDM, with
Brazil being the most vocal in its opposition. Developed coun-
tries are currently pressing ahead for its inclusion and this will
again be on the agenda at the next meeting of the parties to the
UNFCCC in Nairobi in November 2006. 
Gt CO2 1990 2003 2010 2020 2030
World 20.076 24.128 27.698 32.518 36.868
OECD 11.026 12.776 13.794 14.824 15.341
Developing 5.319 8.815 11.063 14.525 18.113
Countries
Table 1: Projected Global Emissions.6
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At the current time it is still unclear whether the UNFCCC/
Kyoto Protocol allows developed countries to implement CCS
projects. Whilst any projects that reduce greenhouse gases at
source can be counted as an emission reduction, and this could
include CCS, there is nothing in the UNFCCC/Kyoto Protocol
that expressly prohibits or allows for CCS storage in geological
formations under the sea. There are also genuine concerns about
the potential for seepage from storage sites, and this complicates
issuing credits for CCS projects. Either a separate mechanism
for CCS may have to be introduced under the Convention, or at
the very least, inventories and accounting of greenhouse gas
reductions will need to be developed and approved by contract-
ing parties to the UNFCCC/Kyoto Protocol. 
MARINE LAWS AND CCS
A number of international marine laws are relevant to CO2
storage under the seas. This includes the United Nations Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”), which regulates all
aspects of the use and protection of the sea. UNCLOS does not
specifically control dumping or prohibit CO2 storage offshore,
but requires states to take indi-
vidually, or jointly, all measures
necessary to prevent, reduce, or
control pollution of the marine
environment.9
UNCLOS is a framework
law, leaving the elaboration of
precise rules to be made in other
more specific laws. The London
Convention and its 1996 Proto-
col are the global laws that con-
trol and regulate the deliberate
disposal of wastes at sea. The
1996 Protocol, which came into
force in 2006, goes beyond the
provisions of its predecessor and
aims to provide greater protec-
tion for the marine environment. Whereas the London Conven-
tion aims to regulate dumping, the Protocol seeks to prevent,
reduce, and where practicable eliminate pollution, and adopts a
precautionary approach as a general obligation. 
Parties to both the London Convention and the 1996 Proto-
col are encouraged to create regional agreements that further
their objectives. There are many regional agreements around the
globe, which provide for protection of the marine environment
in particular jurisdictions.10
Whilst these marine conventions envisage compliance with
other more specific or regional conventions, and indeed operate
together in strengthening environmental protection, states are
only bound to follow the conventions that they ratify or accede.
All of the above international marine conventions have entered
into force: UNCLOS with 149 parties; the London Convention
with 82 parties; and the 1996 Protocol with 27 parties.11 In prac-
tice, if a party is signed up to more than one marine convention,
(e.g., the UK is a party to all of the marine conventions) and
there is overlap, a state would need to apply the standard of the
most specific and stringent treaty. This article will examine the
London Convention and its 1996 Protocol.
THE LONDON CONVENTION AND
ITS 1996 PROTOCOL
There are four important considerations in determining the
legality of CO2 dumping/storage under the London Convention
and 1996 Protocol. The first consideration is whether geological
formations under the sea fall under the Convention’s jurisdic-
tion. The London Convention seeks only to control dumping at
“sea” and would probably not cover CO2 storage. The Protocol
goes beyond the scope of the Convention and applies to dumping
in the “sea, seabed and subsoil.” 
LEGALITY OF CO2 STORAGE
It is arguable whether CO2 storage may be prohibited under
the Protocol, and this turns upon the definitions of “seabed” and
“subsoil” and how far down they go. One interpretation is that
the subsoil is just a layer of rock immediately under the seabed,
whereas another interpretation, and one this author would favor,
is that the Protocol was drafted to cover all areas below the sea
column.12
The next consideration is
whether CO2 can be considered
to be a waste. The London Con-
vention prohibits the disposal of
all wastes specified in Annex I.
CO2 is not specifically referred
to in any of the lists that are pro-
hibited for disposal in Annex I,
but will probably fall under the
“industrial waste” category in
the Annex if it can be shown that
it derived from a manufacturing
or processing operation. The
Protocol is simpler as it places a
general prohibition upon the
dumping of wastes, with the exception of those wastes or matter
to be found listed in Annex I. It is most unlikely that CO2 will
fall within the categories approved for dumping in Annex I. It is
therefore suggested that as CO2 would fall within the definition
of waste under the Convention and Protocol and, as a result,
dumping it would be prohibited. The definition of “dumping” in
both conventions also refers to “wastes or other matter,” so tech-
nically this could also be sufficiently broad enough to include
CO2.
The third consideration is the method of actual disposal.
The Convention and the Protocol both define “dumping” to be
“any deliberate disposal at sea of wastes or other matter from
vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures at sea.”
Therefore, the Convention and Protocol only apply to activities
using ships or platforms to dispose CO2 into the marine environ-
ment and there are no controls governing pipeline discharges
direct from land based sources. This can be supported further by
a provision in the Protocol stating that its remit does not extend
to sub-seabed repositories accessed only from land. It is there-
The problem remains that
the majority of the world’s
commercial energy needs
are met by fossil fuels and
we are no closer to the end
of the fossil fuel era.
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fore suggested that the transportation of CO2, by pipeline, from
land-based courses direct to sub-sea repositories, will not fall
foul of these Conventions.
The fourth consideration is whether there are any excep-
tions within the Conventions, which may also provide a basis for
the storage of CO2. Both of the Conventions exclude from the
definition of “dumping” the disposal or storage of wastes or
other matter directly arising from, or related to the exploration,
exploitation, and associated off-shore processing of seabed min-
eral resources. This would suggest that where CO2 ends up in
storage, following enhanced oil/gas recovery operations, this is
permissible under the Convention and Protocol.
The second possible exception is that both Conventions
exclude from the definition of “dumping” the “placement of
matter for a purpose other than the mere disposal.” It could be
argued that the CO2 is not in fact disposed of, but temporarily
placed until the climate situation
is bought under control. It is
unclear what “placement” is
intended to constitute or what is
its scope, but one could guess it
is intended to cover things such
as the placement of artificial
reefs.13 On balance, it seems
unlikely that one can succeed in
arguing that the CO2 will be
temporarily stored rather than
disposed of, particularly as it
could gradually leak from the
storage site and there are no
plans to recover it later.
CHANGING THE LAW
Contracting Parties to the
London Convention and Proto-
col have recently been dis-
cussing the legal implications of
CO2 storage. A questionnaire
asking Parties for their legal
opinions to a number of ques-
tions was circulated by the Secretariat in 2004. The results of this
questionnaire were discussed at the 27th Meeting of the Parties
in October 2005. There was no agreement amongst parties as to
whether the Convention or the Protocol were compatible with
CCS activities, apart from in some instances that CCS may be
allowed (in enhanced oil and gas recovery for example). It was
agreed that it may be expedient to either reach agreements on the
interpretation of the Protocol and Convention or consider mak-
ing amendments to the legislation.
An Intersessional Legal and Related Issues Working Group
on CO2 Sequestration was established to develop and clarify the
legal issues. This was with a view to facilitating and/or regulat-
ing CCS, and, if appropriate, drafting potential amendment
options to the Protocol or Convention.14 The Scientific Technical
Group to the Conventions was also instructed to make an assess-
ment of the potential risks to the marine environment.15
After the legal and technical working groups met in April
2006, it became clear that the Protocol would be amended in the
first instance. Australia put forward a proposal, co-sponsored by
France, Norway, and the UK, recommending an amendment to
Annex I of the Protocol, thus bringing the regulation of CO2 into
line with the regulation of other substances eligible for dumping
or storage. The proposal would allow for carbon dioxide streams
from CCS consisting “overwhelmingly of CO2” to be stored in
geological formations.16
An amendment to the Annex was pursued because it is eas-
ier to change an Annex rather than a main text of the Conven-
tion. It would have also been considered easier to amend the
Protocol in the first instance as it has less contracting parties.
The next meeting of the Contracting Parties (the 28th Meeting)
will be held in November 2006 and to amend the Protocol will
require a two-thirds agreement of those present at the meeting.
The amendment will then enter
into force immediately for any
party agreeing to it, and for all
other Parties (whether they
agreed to it or not) after a period
of 100 days following the rele-
vant meeting, unless a declara-
tion against acceptance is made
by a Party within that period. 
CONCLUSION
In an ideal world, it is obvi-
ously not a flawless plan to
store/dump CO2 in geological
formations in marine waters.
Many will find transferring pol-
lution from one source to
another to be morally abhorrent,
as well as potentially illegal.
The problem remains that the
majority of the world’s commer-
cial energy needs are met by
fossil fuels and we are no closer
to the end of the fossil fuel era.
The sad truth is that government and industry has been aware of
the threat posed by climate change since the Rio Summit over
fifteen years ago, but have been slow to react and invest in new
clean technologies. 
If we carry on adopting a “business as usual” approach,
global temperatures will continue to increase, sea levels will
rise, and extreme weather events will intensify. This is exacer-
bated by the economic growth in Asian countries. A toolkit of
responses is necessary to deal with the urgency of global warm-
ing, and although CCS could prove unpopular in some quarters,
it will probably have to be deployed worldwide if we want to
continue using fossil fuels up to 2030.
Humans are faced with the difficult environmental choice of
either increasing the CO2 in the atmosphere to dangerous levels,
or possibly polluting marine waters if CO2 is not successfully
stored. Although stored CO2 has the capacity to leak into the sea,
CCS was first considered
as a mitigation tool for
developed countries who
were worried that a rapid
move away from fossil
fuels would cause serious
disruption to their
economies, but still had
binding targets to meet
under Kyoto.
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it should prevent it reaching the atmosphere, which in the
author’s opinion is probably worth the risk. CCS could also pro-
tect the seas because as things stand, there is growing evidence
of ocean acidification caused by higher levels of atmospheric
CO2 being absorbed by the oceans. This is thought to be already
exerting a detrimental effect on marine ecosystems. 
It also seems unlikely that CO2 storage projects will take
place over huge maritime areas. Under UNCLOS, nations have
the greatest amount of coastal jurisdiction and control over the
waters closest to shore, with
increasing responsibility to
accommodate uses by other
nationals as the distance from
shore increases. It is suspected
that most storage sites will
therefore be in countries’ own
exclusive economic zones or
continental shelves. There are
also only a limited number of
suitable storage sites in interna-
tional waters and economic
restrictions will mean that the
majority of projects will take
place where there is existing
infrastructure and the geology is
known. 
Therefore, even though CCS in geological marine forma-
tions could attract criticism, there are imperative reasons for
such projects to go ahead. It is debatable whether a two-thirds
majority will support amending the Protocol when Parties meet
in November 2006. If the vote goes against those pushing for
CCS, then it is very likely it will be back on the agenda for
amendment in 2007. If CO2 storage does receive the two-thirds
majority go-ahead in November 2006, then it is also feasible that
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